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Abstract
There is a controversy in the literature about the economic contribution of public decit.
Keynesian economists generally argue that by spending more on goods and services and in-
frastructure possible budget decit is helpful to create more jobs, reduce unemployment rate
and raise the rate of economic growth of an economy. Neoclassical economists are worried about
the adverse consequences of public decit on capital accumulation and economic growth rate.
Under classical Ricardian equivalence proposition private savings o¤sets public dis-saving thus
budget decit does not matter in the long run. Development economist often warn against
the adverse consequences of budget decit on ination, current account balances and redistri-
bution of income. Empirical evidence is found for a positive or a negative or no e¤ect of debt
on growth. Debt promote growth if it is used for investment and harms growth if it is used for
consumption. Whether debt is more for investment or consumption depends on economic and
political circumstances of a country.
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1 Introduction
The major objectives of scal policy in any country include 1) macroeconomic stabilisation for higher
growth rate of output, full employment, stable prices, interest and exchange rates and low ination
2) attaining horizontal and vertical equity through taxes and transfers and achieving e¢ ciency in
resource allocation and provision of public goods; 3) maximizing positive externality by investing
in public services such as health and education and minimising the negative externality through
appropriate taxes and subsidies. Direct taxes on income, prot and wealth and indirect taxes
including VAT, tari¤, excise, business and subsidies on goods and services and for use of inputs and
spending on pure public goods (defence, law-order, national parks and semi-public goods) including
education, health and R&D are major instruments to achieve these objectives. When the revenue
from taxes, the compulsory payments from citizens to the government, in return of public services
are not enough to meet public spending government borrows from the private sector. It crowds
out private investment raising interest rate, ination as well as the current account decit while it
borrows from the central banks.
There is a controversy in the literature about the economic contribution of public decit. Key-
nesian economists generally argue that by spending more on goods and services and infrastructure,
budget decit is helpful in creating more jobs, reducing the unemployment rate and raising the eco-
nomic growth rate of the economy. Neoclassical economists are more concerned about the adverse
consequences of public decit on capital accumulation and economic growth. Classical economists
under Ricardian equivalence proposition argue that private saving and public decit (dis-saving)
o¤set each other. Despite this all recognise the adverse consequences of excessive budget decit
on ination, current account balances and redistribution of income. How much budget decit
inuences real choices of people through its impact on economic growth is essentially an empiri-
cal issue. Enough debates have taken place regarding the optimal size of the government (Pigou
(1947), Samuelson (1954), Buchanan (1965), Atksinson and Stern (1974), Feldstein (1974), Whal-
ley (1975), Boadway (1979), Summer (1980), Blomquest (1985), Bovenberg (1989), Benabou (2002)
and Taveres (2004)).
Whether decit is good, bad or insignicant partly depends on which of these paradigms one
tends to believe. Barro (1974, 1989) argues for the Ricardian equivalence theory - households with
perfect foresight maintain balance between the present value of their income and expenditure and
internalise the public decit through intertemporal optimisation raising savings to make up for
anticipated higher tax rates in the future. This result may not apply when households face lending
and borrowing constraints. Aiyagari et al. (2002) use a stochastic Ramsey model to prove that
intertemporal balance is essential for maximising welfare but budget need not to be balanced on
a continual basis. They favour tax and expenditure smoothing policies when both of these are
subject to random shocks. Burnheim (1989) denounces Ricardian view in favour of New-Keynesian
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propositions. He draws parallels between these two and suggests decomposing decit into permanent
and temporary parts. In the neoclassical model where farsighted individuals plan consumption over
lifetime, budget decit raises lifetime consumption by shifting taxes to the next generation; this
raises consumption and lowers savings and raises interest rate. Public sector decit then crowds
out private investment. As Diamond (1965) and Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1986) demonstrated high
debt to GDP ratio depresses capital labour ratio. Ni and Wang (1995) have proven how high
saving scal policy regime with lower public sector decit enhances long run growth rate of the
economy. In contrast Keynesian models show positive multiplier e¤ect of budget decit on income
and consumption- which is just inverse of the marginal propensity to save. Beetsma and Giuliodori
(2011) using VAR impulse response analysis have found positive impacts of government purchases
among EU countries. Based on major theoretical paradigms this paper aims to provide empirical
evidence to support in favour or against these theories and reexamine the claim that there is a weak
link between decit and income.
2 Theories on public debt
2.1 Ricardian Equivalence and Neoclassical Arguments on Debt
Ricardian equivalence means that individual households save more in response to a rise in the
budget decit now so that they will be able to pay higher rates of taxes when the government
imposes on them when repaying those debts in the future. The household budget constraint shows
how the accumulation of public debt (Bt+1) and private asset (At+1) in t + 1 period relate to the
current income from wages (WtNt), prots (t), interest income on bonds (1 +Rt)Bt and income
on assets (1 +RAt)At and expenses on consumption (Ct) and taxes (Tt).
Bt+1 +At+1 = WtNt + t   Tt   Ct + (1 +Rt)Bt + (1 +RAt)At (1)
Changes in government borrowing occurs due to di¤erence in government spending and taxes
and the interest rate payment on outstanding debt. Thus the governments budget constraint
becomes:
Bt+1  Bt = Gt   Tt +RtBt =) (1 +Rt)Bt = Bt+1  Gt + Tt (2)
Putting government budget into the household budget constraint
Bt+1 +At+1 = WtNt + t   Tt   Ct +Bt+1  Gt + Tt + (1 +RAt)At (3)
Which yields to Ricardian Equivalence (Only Gt a¤ects household budget not Tt):
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At+1 = WtNt + t   Ct  Gt + (1 +RAt)At (4)
Thus in the classical spirit the larger public sector (Gt) implies smaller private sector assets
(At+1). Then the dynamic equilibrium with this constraint implies market clearing in each period.
Yt = WtNt + t = Ct +Gt (5)
2.2 Role of Debt in a Keynesian Model
Marginal propensity to consume with lump-sum or proportional taxes are key components in a
Keynesian model of government spending.
Y = C + I +G (6)
C = a+ b(Y   T ); a > 0 , 0 < b < 1 (7)
Assume that tax (T ) is collected lump sum and decit (G  T ) is nanced by borrowing (B)
when tax (T ) is not enough to meet expenses (G).
G = T +B (8)
Rearrange for a matrix:
Y   C = I + T +B (9)
 bY + C = a  bT (10)
 
Y
C
!
=
"
1  1
 b 1
# 1 
I + T +B
a  bT
!
(11)
Using Cramers rule
Y =
(I + T +B) + (a  bT )
1  b (12)
C =
(a  bT ) + (I + T +B)
1  b (13)
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Y =
a+ I + (1  b)T
1  b +
B
1  b (14)
Thus the budget decit will have direct impact on output and consumption by the Keynesian
multiplier, @Y@B =
1
1 b > 0 or
@C
@B =
1
1 b > 0: In this set up
@Y
@T = 1 and
@C
@T = 1 a balanced budget
multiplier e¤ect is achieved when budget is exactly balanced, B = 0. By log di¤erentiation it can
be shown that growth rate of GDP depends on the percentage change in the public borrowing:
g
Y
= 1 + 2gB (15)
Here 1 can be negative or positive or zero (1 7 0) depending how the positive e¤ect of
investment compares to the negative impact of taxes. Normally it should be 1 > 0 . The Keynesian
model implies 2 > 0:
This model can be extended to an open economy model by adding exports and imports in the
aggregate demand functions. It can include ination making the interest rate subject to the real
interest rate and using the Fisher equation. With these modications the model becomes:
Y = C + I (r) +G+X   IM (16)
r =    i (17)
IM = mY (18)
Y = C + I (   i) + T +B + CA (19)
X   IM = Y   C   I (r) G = Y   C   I (r)  T  B (20)
If the investment and savings in the private sector are balanced this simply becomes:
X   IM =   (T +B) (21)
Whilst a central bank determines the nominal interest rate the ination is determined from the
money market where the demand for money required for transactions or precautionary purposes
equals the supply of money, which itself is innitely elastic given the central banks commitment to
a certain interest rate.
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MP
= kL (   i) + fY (22)
Taking log di¤erentiation of this function ination is the di¤erence between the growth rate of
money supply and the sum of growth rate of output and liquidity as:
 = gm   gy   gL (23)
From this equation one could link ination, current account decit and decit to the growth
rate of the economy.
gY = 1 + 2gB + 2 + 2gCA + e (24)
From this equation one could argue that higher government decit will lead to higher growth
but this e¤ect could be o¤set by ination and the current account decit. For a sustainable debt
inationtax component of bet should be  = MPY =
G T
Y + (i     g) BY :1
2.3 New-Keynesian business cycle model
Neo-Keynesian business cycle model with leisure and consumption in the utility functions and a
stochastic technology of production is expressed in the following form:
max E
" 1X
t=0
tU (Ct+i; Lt+i) j
t
#
(28)
subject to:
Nt+i + Lt+i = 1 (29)
Ct+i + St+i = Zt+iF (Kt+i; Nt+i) Gt+i (30)
Kt+i 1 = (1  )Kt+i + St+i (31)
First order conditions imply that the disutility from labour should equal the marginal utility
1
 (PB)
PY
+
M
PY
=
PG  PT
PY
+ i
PB
PY
(25)
PB
PY
+
B
Y
=
G  T
Y
+ i
B
Y
  M
PY
(26)


B
Y

=
G  T
Y
+ (i     g) B
Y
  M
PY
(27)
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from work as:
V 0 (Lt+i) =
Wt
Ct
(32)
The rst order condition for optimisation:
E

 (1 + rt+1)
Cit
Cit+1

j
t

= 1 = E

Rt+1
Ct
Ct+1

j
t

(33)
The New Keynesian model thus suggests that the higher government spending leads to lower
private consumption but the decrease is less than one to one. It raises output and employment.
Taxes go up if increase in Gt is permanent and investment is lower. Higher the transitory component
of Gt lower will be its inuence in output. Substitution and income e¤ects work; taxes are highly
discretionary and distortionary. Optimal size of public sector, thus, is a political issue. Higher the
transitory component of output, smaller the decrease in consumption and greater the impact on
output. Ricardian equivalence fails.
2.4 Impacts of public decit in the Neoclassical growth model
Impacts of public decit in a neoclassical growth model could be based on studies of Feldstein (1974),
Whalley (1975), Boadway (1979), Summer (1980), Blomquest (1985), Bovenberg (1989), Rankin
(1992), Ni and Wang (1995), Benabou (2002). Larger public sector decit is found to be harmful
for long term growth in neoclassical growth models where households choose the optimal path of
consumption and accumulation of capital fct; ktg1t=1 in response to public policy that includes plan
of taxes and public expenditure f ; gg1t=1. Particularly the households optimisation problem is:
max
1X
t=0
tU (ct) (34)
subject to
ct + kt+1 = (1   t) f (kt)  t  0 (35)
Euler equation implied by this equals:
Uc ((1   t) f (kt)  kt+1) = Et (1   t+1)Uc ((1   t+1) f (kt+1)  kt+2) f 0 (kt+1) (36)
When government is forced to operate a balanced budget every period the link between tax
revenue and public spending is given by:
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 tf (kt) = G (37)
When government is allowed to operate a structural balance it is permitted to intertemporally
balance the budget
f (kt) +
bt+1
1 + rt
= b+G (38)
Balancing the budget in the entire model horizon would imply
f (k0) G+
1X
t=1
8><>: tf (kt) Gt 1
t=0
(1 + rt)
9>=>; = 0 (39)
Uc ((1   t) f (kt)  kt+1  G) = Et (1   t+1)Uc ((1   t+1) f (kt+1)   kt+2  G) f 0 (kt+1)
(40)
In steady sate
 (1  ) f 0 (k) = 1 (41)


1  G
f 0 (k)

f 0 (k) = 1 (42)
G(k) =

1  G
f 0 (k)

f 0 (k) =
1

(43)
Positive e¤ect of public sector nances is possible only when ratio of public spending to the
marginal productivity of capital (tax rate) is less than one,

1  Gf 0(k)

> 0:
2.5 Cause of a debt crisis
Let R be the risk free payo¤ for investors and R be the return on government bonds. Let  be the
probability of default. Then an arbitrage condition implies
(1  )R = R (44)
Some arrangement yields:
 =
R R
R
(45)
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As the probability of default rises the government need to pay higher interest rate, as shown by
line D in the graph.
Then the government retire debt if T = RD . This implies TD = R. When the interest rate is
low, as at point A, the collected tax revenue is likely to be enough to serve the debt and therefore
probability of default () on public debt is zero. Then 0 <  < 1 between A and B points and
probability of default line is shown by line T. After point T the probability of default is 1 therefore
the government cannot borrow even paying very high interest rate and R =)1 .
When more than one period is involved, then beliefs of other people about the possibility of
default in the next period a¤ects the decision whether to purchase a bond at the current period.
Beliefs about beliefs about beliefs and thus leads to a self fullling crisis.
One could apply above model in the context of current debt crises faced by Greece, Spain or
Portugal in recent years. This is one of the reason why the UK government would like to limit
debt GDP ratio at the reasonable rate of around 76 percent (See Romer (2006), Calvo (1988), Cole
and Keheo (2000)).
3 Credibility:Dynamic Programming Squared (DPS)
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012) characterise the values of a government that are consistent to sus-
tainable reputation using dynamic programming squared (dps) concept following Abreu Pease and
Stachetti (1986, 1990) to deal with a set of value functions associated to the history of a set of
strategy proles of households and governments. On one side they show equivalence of the debt
proles in the rational expectation to that in the competitive equilibrium and they compare these
to the debt proles in the Nash equilibrium. Reputation is subject to ability to commit. This
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requires forming a strategy space that is history dependent. Reputation could be based on the
rational expectation. Credibility is based on beliefs and it leads to the theory of government. They
will do as this is in their interest and feasible. Motives of the government is included along with
that of the households in a dps model.
Household h chooses consumption  2 X and the private sector average x 2 X. The public
sector chooses y, e.g. ination. Utility is u (; x; y) ; when x = Q y =  t+j . This generates
choice problem:
max
2X
u (; x; y)
where choice of household depends on average choice (x) and public policy (y) :  = f (x; y). The
rational expectation equilibrium is equivalent to competitive equilibrium: REE s CE; x = f (x; y)
Set of competitive equilibrium
C =) f(x; y) ; X = h (g)g
For instance in a Ramsey problem, the government chooses y knowing x = ln (y)
max
y2Y
u (h (y) ; h (y) ; y) = max
(x;y)2C
u (x; x; y) =) V R; yR
While the solutions of the Nash equilibrium
 
XN ; yN

satises the competitive equilibrium 
XN ; yN
 2 C, but the Nash solutions are inferior to the rational expectation solutions, G, XN ,
u
 
XN ; Xv; yG

= max
2Y
u (x0; x0; ) =) V N ; yN and V N < V R:
Reputational choice is history dependent. An example of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012) chapter
22:
u (l; c; g) = l + lg (+ c) + lg (+ g) ;  2

0;
1
2

l + g =
 
1 + l

; ( ; g) s y
l () = f

1   if 2(0;1  )
1 if >1  
History t 2 X 8t; xt 2 X 8t; yt 2 X 8t for t 1 1
Vg
!
x;
!
y

=
1  

1X
t=0
tr (xt; yt) ;  2 (0; 1)
!
x;
!
y

= f(xt; yt)g1t=0
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Reputation means choice at t is a function of t  1
yt =
 
Xt 1; Y t 1

3.1 Dynamic programming square
Let V be the value to government in the rst period of following the policy that the private sector
had expected.
Let V1 be the continuation value of known policy.
Let V2 be the continuation value if the private sector believes that the government choice is not
what they expect.
V = (1  )u (x; x; y) + V1 >
(x;y)2C
(1  )u (x; x; ) + V2 ; 8  2 Y
A strategy prole implies a trajectory of outcome (x; y) and a value function
Vg () = Vg [x () ; y ()]
and continuation prole j(x;y); j(x;y):
A strategy prole is a sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE) of innitely repeated economy if 8
t > 1 and 8 (xt; yt) 2
 
Xt 1; Y t 1

a) xt = ht
 
Xt 1; Y t 1

is consistent with the competitive equilibrium where gt
 
Xt 1; Y t 1

b) 8  2 Y
(1  ) (xt; yt) + Vg
 
j(x;y)

>
(x;y)2C
(1  ) (xt; ) + Vg
 
j(x;)

According to Sargent "there should be people in the model to be realistic" and "nding the
state is an art" Similarly for Lucas "complete markets are all alike but each incomplete markets
are incomplete in their own way". The 0dynamic problems of debt due to incomplete markets
strategic interactions among households and forms requires evaluating multiple states of budgets,
information reputation and commitment. For instance consider a simple economy with villagers and
a money lender. Villagers objective is to maximise the expected utility E
1P
t=0
tU (Ct);   (0,1);
U 0 (:) > 0 and U 00 (:) < 0 Cit i =1...N. y
i
t should be a random process given by the joint density. This
endowment economy yit iid prob

yit = y = ys
	
: Complete market case is the AD style contingent
commodity market and leads to complete consumption smoothing. cit = c =
1P
t=0
yss: across all
individual and states. Good is not storable; three possible cases arise a) villager cannot commit but
yit observed, self enforcement, lack of contract b) villager can commit but y
i
t not observed. only the
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money lender can borrow and c) villager can commit and save and borrow yit not observed. This
brings to the theory of distribution among the villages and money lenders and strategies for the
government either a) chooses sequence of  t+j once and walks away and b) choosing sequence of
 t+j in each period. This requires ideas of game in the modelling as above.
4 Empirical Analysis
Economic and political beliefs and circumstances keep changing in response to new opportunities
and di¢ culties which augment theoretical controversy regarding the relationship between growth
and public debt. As the public decisions a¤ect millions of households and rms and their reactions
to announced or anticipated policies vary the empirical analysis of the link becomes of great public
interest. Here data on growth, decit, current account and several macroeconomic variables are
obtained for advanced countries from the World Economic Outlook database of the IMF from 2000
to 2010 including the IMF forecasts for up to 2015.2 This data set is used here to examine whether
the public decit helpful or harmful for economic growth and whether decit stabilises or destabilises
an economy in terms of its impact on ination and current account decit. Regression coe¢ cients
of decit or a set of variables including decit multiple explanatory variables are estimated using
the OLS or GLS models and examining their validity on the basis of t; F , 2 and R2 tests. These
empirical ndings imply that:
1. Public borrowing enhances economics growth; borrowing must nance projects with positive
externalities for this.
2. The relationship between the general level of prices and net public borrowing is negative when
net borrowing enhances growth and positive when such borrowing funds public consumption.
3. More net borrowing deteriorates the current account balance. As economy grows imports
may increase faster than exports.
Net borrowing a¤ects growth rates and prices di¤erently in di¤erent countries. Time series data
from the World Economic Outlook of the IMF is used here to study relationships between growth
rates of output and debt ratios among various groups of countries in the world.
4.1 Summary Growth Debt Ratio Regressions
The average growth rates vary signicantly across groups of countries; emerging Asia grew on
average by 5.1 percent but advanced economies grew by 2.6 on average. The average debt GDP
ratio was lowest at 44.5 in Asia and very high at 65.5 in Africa. Maximum debt GDP ratio was
2http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/index.aspx
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recorded for Africa. Correlations between growth and debt by groups of countries are shown in the
last two column. Positive correlations were more frequent than the negative correlations. Causality
of debt ratio growth rate are then tested in a set of regressions for each of these countries as shown
in Tables 8 to 13.
Table 1: Avege growth rate and debt ratio and the nature of growth deb ratio correltions (1991-
2020)
growth and deb ratio Correlations
Country Groups g d/y max (d/y) N +  
Advanced Countries 2.6 58.2 251 37 1461 1314
Emerging Asia 5.1 44.5 122 21 482 421
Eastern Europe 3.1 49.0 106 9 95 76
Middle East 4.8 63.5 454 19 434 307
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.4 65.5 786 45 2263 1832
Latin America 3.2 54.5 154 32 1133 947
Data source: Word Economic Outlook, 2015, April, IMF 1991-2020.
Among advanced countries Hong Kong had the lowest debt ratio at most of 7 percent. Japan
had it around 251 percents. Singapore, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia grew impressively
during this period while the UK and the USA grew by 4 and 4.7 percents respectively. Regression by
countries provides evidence for both positive and negative coe¢ cients. Sixteen of these advanced
countries had negative and signicant impact of deb ratio on growth rates. This relation was
insignicant in other countries. Thus for advanced countries debt is a¤ecting growth negatively.
Emerging Asian includes large countries such as China, India and Indonesia but also tiny small
countries including Bhutan, Maldives Papua New Guinea. While the average debt ratio in Bhutan
was up to 122 percent of GDP it was only 3 percent in Borneo. In contrast to regions average rate
of 5.1, China was growing at 9.4 and India at 6.7 percent during the study period. Debt ratio had
signicant and negative impact on economic growth in ten out of twenty one countries of this region.
Only Bhutan had positive and signicant e¤ect of debt ratio on growth. for others coe¢ cient were
insignicant.
Debt ratio signicantly lowered growth rates in 26 out of 45 countries in Sub Sahran Africa. It
had positive impact in three countries such as Benin, Cameroon and Namibia. Coe¢ cients were
not signicant for other countries. There was wide volatility in growth and debt ratios over time
among countries in this region. Debt ratio was more volatile than economic growth rate.
Debt ratio had negative impact on growth rates only in ve out of nineteen countries in the
Middle East, these countries were Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Pakistan and the UAE. Debt had
harmful e¤ect on growth rate in six out of nine countries in the Eastern Europe. Coe¢ cient of
debt ratio on growth regression was signicant only six out of 32 Latin America and Caribbean
Countries.
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From these empirical analysis on grow debt ratio regression it is not possible to state denitely
that higher debt ratio causes lower growth rate. Whilst the negative impact was observed in many
more countries than the positive impacts, number of countries with insignicant coe¢ cients is quite
high. Is debt used for investment or consumption purposes? If it is for investment purpose higher
debt does not lower the GDP growth rate though there are chances that it will raise it. If the debt
is used for consumption this will have negative impacts on economic growth. Thus the analysis
of debt growth relation would not be complete until the investment or consumption uses of debts
are analysed explicitly. Such decomposition is beyond the scope of current analysis as getting such
information for all countries included in this empirical analysis is very di¢ cult.
4.2 Analysis of the UK economy
These estimates are tested for heteroskedasticity, autocorrelations and any restrictions as appropri-
ate.
Regresses growth rate of output (Yi) on net borrowing (Xi) as:
Yi = 1 + 2Xi + ei i = 1 :::T
Following the OLS technique to nd estimators of b1 and b2.
b = (X 0X) 1X 0Y (46)
These estimates are subject to standard OLS assumptions on error terms normality ei 
N
 
0; 2

, homoskedaticity, non- autororrelation (E ("i"j) = 0) and independence of errors from
the dependent variables, (E ("iXi) = 0).
" b1b2
#
==
"
N
P
XiP
Xi
P
X2i
# 1 " b1b2
#
=
"
12  51:92
 51:92 413:52
# 1 "
21:3
 26:23
#
=
"
3:283
0:349
#
(47)
Where k = number of parameters in the regression; N = number of observations
Table 2: Testing overall signicance by F-test
Source of Variance Sum Degrees of freedom Mean F-value
Total sum square (TSS) 56.597 12 5.145
Regression Sum Square (RSS) 22.967 1 22.967 6.147
Sum of square error 33.629 10 3.737
Table of results summarising all above calculations are presented as:
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Table 3: Growth on net borrowing
Coe¢ cient Standard Error t-value
Intercept 3.283 0.783 4.191
Net borrowing 0.349 0.133 2.613
R2 = 0.406 , F = 6:147 ; N = 12:
Coe¢ cients as well as t-statistics are signicant. Autocorrelation is positive because d = 1:74 < 2
but that is not statistically signicant. The calculated DW value, d = 1:74 is clearly out of the
inconclusive region as it does not fall in the range of [0:971; 1:331] of the Durbin-Watson table.
White test or ARCH and AR test suggest there is slight problem of heteroskedasticity in the errors
in this model. However, heteroskedasticity is more serious for cross section than for time series.
Therefore conclusion of above model are still valid. One way is to regress predicted square errorsbe2i in predicated square of y, bY 2i . The test statistics for normality of errors is nR2  2df with df
=1.
be2i = 0 + 1 bY 2i + vi ; n:R2 = 6:089 (48)
be2i = 0 + 1X1;i + 2X2;i + 3X21;i + 4X22;i + 5X1;iX2;i + vi (49)
Null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected as nR2 = 6:089 > 2df = 2:7055.
Table 4: Price index on net borrowing
Coe¢ cient Standard Error t-value
Intercept 102.5 1.603 63.9
Net borrowing -1.85 0.273 -6.76
R2 = 0.82 , F = 45:7 [0:00] ; N = 12 ; DW = 1:09
Table 5: Current account balance on net borrowing
Coe¢ cient Standard Error t-value
Intercept -2.44 0.225 -10.8
Net borrowing -0.008 0.038 -2.20
R2 = 0.33 , F = 4:9 [0:05] ; N = 12 ; DW = 1:03
Prices were relatively stable despite scal expansion during the study period as the monetary
policy mainly concerned in achieving the target ination, had been complementary to the scal pol-
icy in UK in the period of study Table 4. However higher borrowing had caused slight deterioration
in the current account, as both consumers and producers tend to import more in response to higher
income they received from scal expansion. There is weak evidence on simultaneity between growth
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and decit in UK in last ten years. Past records like this may or may not apply for projecting the
impacts of current debt reduction plans in the future years; these require analysis of the impacts of
such decit in the path of economy under dynamic general equilibrium system or under the DSGE
or VAR frameworks. One important concept in the literature that handles this issue is the dynamic
programming squared presented briey in the next section.
4.3 Conclusion
There is a controversy in the literature about the economic contribution of public decit. Keynesian
economists generally argue that by spending more on goods and services and infrastructure possible,
the public decit is helpful to create more jobs, reduce unemployment rate and raise the economic
growth rate of the economy. Neoclassical economists are worried about the adverse consequences of
public decit on capital accumulation and the long run growth rate. Classical Ricardian equivalence
proposition does not match well with the empirical evidences on adverse consequences of budget
decit on ination, current account balances and redistribution of income.
Empirical evidence is found for a positive or a negative or no e¤ect of debt on growth. Debt
promote growth if it is used for investment and harms growth if it is used for consumption. Whether
debt is more for investment or consumption depends on economic and political circumstances of a
country.
In practice this is essentially an empirical issue, evidence suggests that the role of decit largely
depends on economic circumstances. Empirical estimates in this paper show that decit has con-
tributed for growth in UK; 1 percent increase in net borrowing would raise growth rate by 0.34
percent between 2000 and 2010. In other words statistical and econometric evidence clearly suggests
that reducing decit will lower the growth rate; proposed decit reduction plan will clearly slow
down the growth rates.
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A Appendix
A.1 A: Blake-Weale (1994) model of debt
Fiscal policy makers choose the tax rate that is consistent to the target level of debt and take the
actions of central bank as given; the monetary policy makers choose the interest rate in order to
stabilise the price level taking the choice of the scal authority as given. This is a simple but very
powerful model to explain the time path of debt (Dt) in the economy.
Dt = RtDt 1 + Et   Tt (1)
Expenditure (Et) is proportional to income
Et =  Yt (2)
Expenditure (Et) is proportional to income
Tt = StYt (3)
Output:
Yt = Y t
 
Rt  Rt
   
St   St
 
(4)
Phillips curve
t = 
e
t + 
Yt
Y t
(5)
Ination expectation
t = t 1 (6)
Steady state output
Y t = Y 0e
gt (7)
By substitutions
t = t 1   st   rt (8)
log of expenditure, tax revenue and output functions:
et =  + yt (9)
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tt = st + yt (10)
yt = g   rt   st (11)
By dening ratios of debt and tax revenue B = DE ;K =
T
E and log of debt as:
dt =  +
1 + r
1 + g
dt 1 +
1
B
(et  Ktt) + 1
1 + g
rt (12)
where
 =
gB + (1 K) (b  g) + kK
B
  r
1 + g
(13)
Proof for this statement:
Dt = RtDt 1 + Et   Tt = (1 + rt)Dt 1 + Et   Tt (14)
Dt
Dt 1
  (1 + rt) = Et + Et 1
Et 1
Et 1
Dt 1

1  Tt
Et

(15)
Dt
Dt 1
  (1 + rt) = Et + Et 1
Et 1
Et 1
Dt 1

1  Tt
Et

(16)
(1 + g)  (1 + r) = (1 + g) 1
B
(1 K) (17)
r   g
(1 K) =
(1 + g)
B
(18)
Dynamic e¢ ciency requires that r > g.
Taylor approximation:
g   b+ 1 + g
g   r (dt   g) +
1
g   r (rt   r) +
K
1 K (tt   et   k) ' et   dt 1 (19)
dt =  +
1 + r
1 + g
dt 1 +
1
B
(et  Ktt) + 1
1 + g
rt (20)
Stochastic optimal control method and learning
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A.2 B: Cole-Kehoe (2000) model of self fullling debt crisis
Cole and Kehoe (2000) use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which self-fullling
crisis may arise. They say that "Because of the governments need to roll over its debt, a liquidity
crunch induced by the inability to sell new debt can lead to a self-fullling default" and "if
fundamentals like the level of the governments debt, its maturity structure, and the private capital
stock, lie within a particular range (the crisis zone), then the probability of default is determined
by the beliefs of market participants."
It is "also related to the literature on how the governments inability to commit to future policy
choices can generate multiple equilibria."
Household:
E
1X
t=0
t (Ct + V (gt))) (1)
ct + kt+1 < (1  )atf(kt) (2)
Banker:
E
1X
t=0
txt (3)
xt 5 x+ ztbt   qtbt+1 (4)
Government budget constraint:
gt + ztBt 5 attf(kt) + qtBt+1 (5)
Timing. The timing of actions within each period is the following.
1. The sunspot variable t is realized, and the aggregate state is st = (Bt;Kt; at 1; t)
2. The government, taking the price schedule qt = q(st; Bt+1) as given, chooses Bt+1.
3. The international bankers, taking qt as given, choose bt.
4. The government chooses whether or not to default, zt, and how much to consume, gt
5. The consumers, taking at as given, choose ct and kt+1.
Consumers dynamic problem:
Vc(k; s;B
0; g; z) = max
c;k0
c+ v(g) + EVc(k
0; s0; B0(s0); g0; z0) (6)
subject to
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c+ k0 5 (1  )a(s; z)f(k) (7)
c; k0 > 0 (8)
s = (B0;K 0(s;B0; g; z); a(s; z); c0); (9)
g0 = g(s0; B0(s0); q(s0; B0(s0))); (10)
z = z(s0; B0(s0); q(s0; B0(s0))) (11)
The representative bankers value function is dened by the functional equation
Vb(b; s; B
0) = max
b0
x+ z(s;B0; q(s;B0))b  q(s;B0)b0 + EVb(b0; s0; B0(s0)); (12)
subject to
q(s;B0)b0 5 x (13)
b0 >  A; (14)
s = (B0;K 0(s;B0; g; z); a(s; z); c0) (15)
The governments value function is dened by the functional equation
Vg(s) = max
B0
c(K; s;B0; g; z) + v(g) + EVg(s0); (16)
subject to
g = g(s;B0; q(s;B0)); (17)
z = z(s;B0; q(s;B0)) (18)
s = (B0;K 0(s;B0; g; z); a(s; z); c0) (19)
23
Later in the period, the government makes its default choice z, which in turn determines the
level of productivity a and, through its budget constraint, the level of government spending g.
Given the governments initial value function, Vg(s), they dene the policy functions g(s;B0; q) and
z(s;B0; q) as the solutions to the problem
max
g;z
c(K; s;B0; g; z) + v(g) + EVg(s0) (20)
subject to
g + zB 5 a(s; z)f(K) + qB0; (21)
z = 0 or z = 1 (22)
g > 0 (23)
s0 = (B0;K 0(s;B0; g; z); a(s; z); 0) (24)
Denition of an equilibrium. An equilibrium is a list of value functions Vc for the representative
consumer, Vb for the representative banker, and Vg for the government;policy functions c and k0 for
the consumer, b0 for the banker, and B0, g, and z for the government; a price function q; and an
equation of motion for the aggregate capital stock K 0 such that:
1. Given B
0
, g, and z, Vc is the value function for the solution to the representative consumers
problem, and c and k0 are the maximizing choices;
2. Given B0, q, and z, Vb is the value function for the solution to the representative bankers
problem, and the value of B0 chosen by the government solves the problem whenb = B;
3. Given q; c;K 0; g; and z; Vg is the value function for the solution to the governments rst
problem (), and B0 is the maximizing choice. Furthermore, given
C;K 0; Vg; and B0; g and z solve the governments second problem ();
4. B0(s) 2 b0(B; s;B0);
5. K 0(s;B0; g; z) = k0(K; s;B0; g; z).
A.3 Regression analysis : growth rates on debt GDP ratios
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Table 6: Growth rate of output on debt gdp ratio in advanced countries, 1991-2020
Coe¢ cient t-prob R2 F-prob Constant t-prob
Australia -0.014 0.521 0.015 0.521 3.420 0.000
Austria -0.084 0.001 0.311 0.001 7.977 0.000
Belgium 0.005 0.803 0.002 0.803 1.216 0.544
Canada 0.000 0.998 0.000 0.999 2.246 0.469
Cyprus -0.099 0.001 0.482 0.000 9.556 0.000
Czech Republic -0.052 0.333 0.043 0.332 3.962 0.032
Denmark 0.031 0.275 0.044 0.275 0.036 0.980
Estonia -0.792 0.111 0.102 0.111 9.586 0.012
Finland -0.050 0.391 0.026 0.391 3.946 0.171
France -0.022 0.100 0.094 0.100 3.134 0.003
Germany -0.077 0.032 0.154 0.032 6.342 0.006
Greece -0.069 0.001 0.352 0.001 9.410 0.000
Hong Kong SAR -0.464 0.405 0.039 0.405 6.354 0.049
Iceland -0.069 0.013 0.200 0.013 6.520 0.000
Ireland -0.057 0.007 0.232 0.370 8.328 0.000
Israel -0.045 0.370 0.043 0.370 6.983 0.076
Italy -0.053 0.046 0.135 0.046 6.719 0.027
Japan -0.077 0.032 0.154 0.032 6.342 0.006
Korea -0.045 0.002 0.290 0.002 9.357 0.000
Latvia -0.296 0.000 0.431 0.001 11.560 0.000
Lithuania -0.279 0.023 0.244 0.023 12.168 0.002
Luxembourg -0.124 0.039 0.166 0.039 5.071 0.000
Malta -0.061 0.595 0.017 0.595 6.438 0.402
Netherlands -0.059 0.190 0.070 0.190 5.301 0.051
New Zealand -0.051 0.100 0.094 0.100 4.326 0.000
Norway -0.021 0.509 0.016 0.509 3.062 0.128
Portugal -0.040 0.002 0.290 0.002 4.805 0.000
San Marino -0.094 0.712 0.009 0.712 1.209 0.814
Singapore -0.124 0.047 0.134 0.047 16.687 0.004
Slovak Republic -0.211 0.001 0.382 0.001 13.014 0.000
Slovenia -0.051 0.019 0.210 0.019 4.857 0.000
Spain -0.042 0.018 0.184 0.018 4.856 0.000
Sweden 0.005 0.898 0.000 0.898 2.103 0.232
Switzerland 0.007 0.852 0.001 0.852 1.282 0.232
Taiwan Province of China -0.127 0.284 0.052 0.284 8.464 0.365
United Kingdom -0.016 0.289 0.043 0.269 2.941 0.002
United States -0.011 0.510 0.025 0.510 3.110 0.053
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Table 7: Growth rate of output on debt gdp ratio in Asian countries, 1991-2020
Coe¢ cient t-prob R2 F-prob Constant t-prob
Bangladesh -0.065 0.008 0.362 0.008 8.586 0.000
Bhutan 0.028 0.084 0.110 0.084 5.090 0.000
Brunei Darussalam -0.106 0.819 0.002 0.819 2.239 0.005
Cambodia 0.089 0.453 0.025 0.452 4.690 0.227
China -0.212 0.000 0.622 0.000 16.944 0.000
Fiji -0.009 0.901 0.001 0.901 2.970 0.418
India -0.072 0.201 0.060 0.202 11.829 0.006
Indonesia -0.056 0.000 0.636 0.000 7.340 0.000
Kiribati 0.296 0.145 0.077 0.145 -1.976 0.402
Lao P.D.R. -0.043 0.000 0.715 0.000 10.501 0.000
Malaysia 0.001 0.994 0.000 0.994 5.642 0.172
Maldives -0.041 0.258 0.047 0.258 8.371 0.000
Nepal -0.021 0.291 0.058 0.291 5.181 0.000
Papua New Guinea -0.144 0.032 0.170 0.033 11.262 0.001
Philippines -0.073 0.012 0.227 0.012 8.385 0.000
Samoa -0.076 0.302 0.051 0.302 5.634 0.124
Sri Lanka -0.134 0.027 0.168 0.027 17.632 0.002
Thailand -0.206 0.029 0.190 0.029 12.909 0.005
Vanuatu -0.160 0.082 0.126 0.082 7.019 0.010
Vietnam -0.048 0.000 0.527 0.000 8.730 0.000
Table 8: Growth rate of output on debt gdp ratio in Middle Eastern Countries, 1991-2020
Coe¢ cient t-prob R2 F-prob Constant t-prob
Algeria -0.024 0.040 0.147 0.040 3.993 0.003
Bahrain -0.046 0.018 0.191 0.018 5.861 0.000
Djibouti 0.045 0.992 0.024 0.493 6.933 0.072
Egypt -0.097 0.009 0.336 0.009 12.545 0.000
Jordan -0.004 0.874 0.001 0.874 5.314 0.027
Kuwait 0.134 0.176 0.067 0.176 1.648 0.727
Lebanon -0.004 0.911 0.001 0.910 4.418 0.466
Libya -0.050 0.766 0.003 0.766 6.306 0.438
Mauritania -0.018 0.239 0.072 0.239 7.059 0.007
Morocco -0.079 0.311 0.038 0.311 9.144 0.081
Oman -0.010 0.852 0.001 0.851 3.718 0.000
Pakistan -0.123 0.015 0.215 0.015 12.301 0.005
Qatar -0.009 0.921 0.000 0.921 9.324 0.010
Saudi Arabia -0.023 0.173 0.091 0.173 5.030 0.000
Sudan 0.019 0.453 0.021 0.453 5.549 0.189
Syria 0.000 0.993 0.000 0.994 4.758 0.048
Tunisia 0.046 0.224 0.054 0.224 1.576 0.460
UAE -0.275 0.021 0.238 0.021 7.432 0.000
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Table 9: Growth rate of output on debt gdp ratio in Eastern European Countries, 1991-2020
Coe¢ cient t-prob R2 F-prob Constant t-prob
Albania -0.218 0.020 0.268 0.020 18.197 0.003
Bosnia and Herz. -0.156 0.040 0.214 0.040 9.022 0.003
Bulgaria 0.005 0.986 0.000 0.986 2.990 0.077
Croatia -0.088 0.007 0.361 0.006 6.968 0.001
Hungary -0.187 0.002 0.416 0.002 15.244 0.001
Poland -0.002 0.985 0.000 0.985 3.720 0.361
Romania -0.195 0.016 0.283 0.016 9.102 0.001
Serbia -0.151 0.002 0.423 0.002 11.784 0.000
Turkey -0.084 0.232 0.078 0.232 7.492 0.029
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Table 10: Growth rate of output on debt gdp ratio in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1991-2020
Coe¢ cient t-prob R2 F-prob Constant t-prob
Angola -0.155 0.020 0.254 0.020 14.708 0.000
Benin 0.047 0.060 0.174 0.060 3.005 0.002
Botswana -0.218 0.235 0.066 0.235 7.565 0.002
Burkina Faso -0.012 0.813 0.003 0.058 6.363 0.001
Burundi -0.021 0.013 0.427 0.001 5.305 0.000
Cabo Verde -0.067 0.027 0.258 0.027 10.440 0.001
Cameroon 0.017 0.077 0.156 0.077 3.487 0.000
Central African Republic 0.009 0.891 0.001 0.891 0.384 0.940
Chad -0.067 0.536 0.019 0.536 9.200 0.016
Comoros -0.023 0.029 0.227 0.029 3.729 0.000
Congo (DR) -0.068 0.000 0.643 0.000 9.604 0.000
Republic of Congo -0.021 0.003 0.279 0.003 6.267 0.000
Côte dIvoire -0.069 0.022 0.217 0.022 8.171 0.001
Equatorial Guinea 0.082 0.491 0.018 0.491 13.673 0.086
Eritrea -0.057 0.346 0.047 0.346 9.215 0.273
Ethiopia -0.065 0.005 0.261 0.005 11.176 0.000
Gabon -0.055 0.072 0.115 0.072 5.476 0.002
The Gambia -0.161 0.533 0.021 0.533 5.796 0.039
Ghana -0.383 0.034 0.156 0.034 8.218 0.000
Guinea -0.016 0.141 0.079 0.141 4.922 0.000
Guinea-Bissau -0.001 0.906 0.001 0.906 3.480 0.008
Kenya -0.178 0.034 0.198 0.034 13.276 0.002
Lesotho -0.013 0.358 0.031 0.358 5.053 0.000
Liberia -0.012 0.079 0.017 0.079 7.355 0.008
Madagascar -0.010 0.779 0.004 0.779 3.957 0.081
Malawi -0.036 0.025 0.261 0.025 7.267 0.000
Mali -0.026 0.413 0.036 0.413 5.726 0.001
Mauritius -0.238 0.001 0.449 0.001 16.306 0.001
Mozambique 0.004 0.846 0.002 0.846 7.502 0.000
Namibia 0.212 0.045 0.145 0.045 -0.258 0.091
Niger -0.039 0.123 0.100 0.123 7.410 0.000
Nigeria -0.007 0.804 0.003 0.804 7.055 0.000
Rwanda -0.069 0.265 0.051 0.265 10.663 0.014
São Tomé and Príncipe -0.005 0.089 0.152 0.089 5.591 0.000
Senegal 0.016 0.571 0.017 0.571 3.644 0.014
Seychelles -0.017 0.322 0.036 0.322 5.737 0.011
Sierra Leone 0.013 0.717 0.007 0.717 6.178 0.077
South Africa -0.095 0.023 0.244 0.023 6.734 0.000
South Sudan 3.105 0.089 0.404 0.090 -66.676 0.101
Swaziland -0.076 0.041 0.151 0.041 3.763 0.000
Tanzania -0.011 0.706 0.008 0.706 6.931 0.000
Togo -0.081 0.000 0.600 0.000 9.426 0.000
Uganda -0.214 0.463 0.025 0.463 7.462 0.000
Zambia -0.081 0.210 0.081 0.210 8.743 0.000
Zimbabwe -0.026 0.925 0.000 0.925 3.138 0.83728
Table 11: Growth rate of output on debt gdp ratio in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1991-2020
Coe¢ cient t-prob R2 F-prob Constant t-prob
Equatorial Guinea 0.082 0.491 0.018 0.491 13.673 0.086
Eritrea -0.057 0.346 0.047 0.346 9.215 0.273
Ethiopia -0.065 0.005 0.261 0.005 11.176 0.000
Gabon -0.055 0.072 0.115 0.072 5.476 0.002
The Gambia -0.161 0.533 0.021 0.533 5.796 0.039
Ghana -0.383 0.034 0.156 0.034 8.218 0.000
Guinea -0.016 0.141 0.079 0.141 4.922 0.000
Guinea-Bissau -0.001 0.906 0.001 0.906 3.480 0.008
Kenya -0.178 0.034 0.198 0.034 13.276 0.002
Lesotho -0.013 0.358 0.031 0.358 5.053 0.000
Liberia -0.012 0.079 0.017 0.079 7.355 0.008
Madagascar -0.010 0.779 0.004 0.779 3.957 0.081
Malawi -0.036 0.025 0.261 0.025 7.267 0.000
Mali -0.026 0.413 0.036 0.413 5.726 0.001
Mauritius -0.238 0.001 0.449 0.001 16.306 0.001
Mozambique 0.004 0.846 0.002 0.846 7.502 0.000
Namibia 0.212 0.045 0.145 0.045 -0.258 0.091
Niger -0.039 0.123 0.100 0.123 7.410 0.000
Nigeria -0.007 0.804 0.003 0.804 7.055 0.000
Rwanda -0.069 0.265 0.051 0.265 10.663 0.014
São Tomé and Príncipe -0.005 0.089 0.152 0.089 5.591 0.000
Senegal 0.016 0.571 0.017 0.571 3.644 0.014
Seychelles -0.017 0.322 0.036 0.322 5.737 0.011
Sierra Leone 0.013 0.717 0.007 0.717 6.178 0.077
South Africa -0.095 0.023 0.244 0.023 6.734 0.000
South Sudan 3.105 0.089 0.404 0.090 -66.676 0.101
Swaziland -0.076 0.041 0.151 0.041 3.763 0.000
Tanzania -0.011 0.706 0.008 0.706 6.931 0.000
Togo -0.081 0.000 0.600 0.000 9.426 0.000
Uganda -0.214 0.463 0.025 0.463 7.462 0.000
Zambia -0.081 0.210 0.081 0.210 8.743 0.000
Zimbabwe -0.026 0.925 0.000 0.925 3.138 0.837
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Table 12: Growth rate of output on debt gdp ratio in Latin America and Carrebean Countries,
1991-2020
Coe¢ cient t-prob R2 F-prob Constant t-prob
Antigua and Barbuda -0.014 0.835 0.002 0.835 3.798 0.582
Argentina -0.104 0.004 0.268 0.005 8.823 0.000
The Bahamas 0.055 0.224 0.056 0.224 3.954 0.042
Barbados -0.02 0.261 0.05 0.261 2.443 0.065
Belize 0.12 0.187 0.095 0.187 -6.222 0.422
Bolivia -0.056 0.001 0.426 0.001 6.84 0.000
Brazil -0.038 0.766 0.005 0.766 5.139 0.546
Chile -0.065 0.51 0.02 0.509 3.97 0.011
Colombia -0.087 0.358 0.037 0.359 6.788 0.056
Costa Rica -0.077 0.287 0.059 0.287 7.544 0.013
Dominica -0.028 0.439 0.023 0.439 4.123 0.124
Dominican Republic -0.109 0.101 0.118 0.101 7.961 0.000
Ecuador -0.131 0.012 0.302 0.012 7.992 0.001
El Salvador -0.074 0.008 0.243 0.008 6.202 0.000
Grenada -0.05 0.143 0.08 0.143 6.484 0.024
Guatemala 0.026 0.81 0.003 0.06 2.973 0.239
Guyana -0.02 0.305 0.048 0.305 5.085 0.010
Haiti -0.019 0.682 0.008 0.682 2.95 0.119
Honduras -0.048 0.176 0.094 0.176 5.905 0.002
Jamaica -0.019 0.382 0.034 0.382 2.992 0.256
Mexico 0.084 0.558 0.015 0.558 -1.049 0.870
Nicaragua 0.004 0.755 0.004 0.776 3.826 0.001
Panama -0.058 0.12 0.09 0.12 9.793 0.001
Paraguay -0.177 0.012 0.216 0.013 7.89 0.002
Peru -0.132 0.019 0.256 0.019 8.724 0.000
St. Kitts and Nevis -0.025 0.196 0.072 0.196 5.522 0.014
St. Lucia -0.024 0.278 0.045 0.278 3.225 0.033
St. Vincent and the Grenadines -0.041 0.404 0.027 0.404 5.285 0.105
Suriname -0.012 0.744 0.004 0.744 3.851 0.010
Trinidad and Tobago -0.035 0.7 0.008 0.7 6.009 0.146
Uruguay -0.159 0.002 0.4 0.003 14.255 0.000
Venezuela 0.002 0.989 0 0.989 1.277 0.800
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